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Abstract
It was a quarter of a century ago that Sobolev proved the reduced game (otherwise
called consistency) property for the much-discussed Shapley value of cooperative TU-
games. The purpose of this paper is to extend Sobolev’s result in two ways. On the
one hand the unied approach applies to the enlarged class consisting of game-theoretic
solutions that possess a so-called potential representation; on the other Sobolev’s reduced
game is strongly adapted in order to establish the consistency property for solutions
that admit a potential. Actually, Sobolev’s explicit description of the reduced game is
now replaced by a similar, but implicit denition of the modied reduced game; the
characteristic function of which is implicitly determined by a bijective mapping on the
universal game space (induced by the solution in question). The resulting consistency
property solves an outstanding open problem for a wide class of game-theoretic solutions.
As usual, the consistency together with some kind of standardness for two-person games
fully characterize the solution. A detailed exposition of the developed theory is given in
the event of dealing with so-called semivalues of cooperative TU-games and the Shapley
and Banzhaf values in particular.
Keywords: cooperative TU-game, reduced game, solution, consistency, potential, semi-
value
1991 Mathematics Subject Classi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1 Introduction
In physics a vector eld u is said to be conservative if there exists a continuously dierentiable
function U called potential the gradient of which agrees with the vector eld (notation: 5U =
u). There exist several characterizations of conservative vector elds (e.g., 5jui = 5iuj, or
every contour integral with respect to the vector eld u is zero). Surprisingly, the successful
treatment of the potential in physics turned out to be reproducible, in the late eighties, in
the mathematical eld called cooperative game theory. Informally, a solution concept  on
the universal game space G is said to possess a potential representation if it is the discrete
gradient of a real-valued function P on G called potential (notation: 5P =  ). In other
words, if possible, each component of the game-theoretic solution may be interpreted as the
incremental return with respect to the potential function. In their innovative paper, Hart
and Mas-Colell (cf. [6]) showed that the well-known game-theoretic solution called Shapley
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value is the unique solution that has a potential representation and meets the eciency
principle as well. In the second stage (the nineties) of the potential research into the solution
part of cooperative game theory, various researchers contributed dierent, but equivalent
characterizations of (not necessarily ecient) solutions that admit a potential (cf. [9], [1], [11]).
Almost all of these characterizations of solutions, stated in terms of the potential approach
applied in cooperative game theory, resemble similar ones stated in physical terminology. For
instance, the characterization 5jui = 5iuj of a conservative vector eld u is analogous to
its discrete version 5j i = 5i j with respect to a game-theoretic solution  , commonly
known as the law of preservation of discrete dierences (cf. [9]), otherwise called the balanced
contributions principle (cf. [1], [8], [11]).
One characterization with no counterpart in physics states that a game-theoretic solution
possesses a potential representation if and only if the solution for any game equals the Shapley
value of another game induced by both the initial game and the relevant solution concept
(cf. [1]). Our main goal is to exploit this particular characterization whenever one deals with
the so-called reduced game (or consistency) property for solutions. Generally speaking, the
consistency property is a very powerful and widely used tool to axiomatize game-theoretic
solutions (cf. the surveys on consistency in [4], [7]). In the early seventies Sobolev (cf. [13])
established the consistency property for the well-known Shapley value with respect to an
appropriately chosen reduced game. With Sobolev’s result at hand, we are in a position
to establish, under certain circumstances, the consistency property for a solution that has
a potential representation. For that purpose the consistency property is formulated with
respect to a strongly adapted version of the reduced game used by Sobolev. Section 2 is
devoted to the whole treatment of the relevant consistency property (see Theorem 2.4) the
proof of which is based on the particular characterization of solutions that admit a potential.
The resulting consistency property solves an outstanding open problem for a wide class of
solutions. Moreover, we add an axiomatization for these solutions in terms of their consistency
property, together with some kind of standardness for two-person games (see Theorem 2.6).
Our modied reduced game diers from Sobolev’s reduced game only in that any game is
replaced by its image under a bijective mapping on the universal game space (induced by the
solution in question). The particular bijective mapping, induced by the Shapley value, equals
the identity. To be exact, Sobolev’s explicit description of the reduced game refers to the
initial game itself, whereas our similar, but implicit denition of the modied reduced game
is formulated in terms of the image of both the modied reduced game and the initial game
(see Theorem 2.4).
In the general framework concerning an arbitrary solution that admits a potential, there is no
way to acquire more information about the associated bijective mapping and consequently, the
implicit denition of the modied reduced game can not be explored any further to strengthen
the consistency property for this solution. For a certain type of solutions called semivalues
(cf. [5]), however, the associated bijective mapping and its inverse are computable and hence,
under these particular circumstances, one gains an insight into the modied reduced game
itself. Section 3 is devoted to the whole treatment of these semivalues and, in the setting of
the consistency property for these semivalues, we provide various elegant interpretations of
the modied reduced game (see Theorems 3.3 and 3.4).
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2 Consistency property for solutions that admit a potential
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU) is a pair hN; vi, where N is a nonempty,
nite set and v : 2N ! R is a characteristic function, dened on the power set of N , satisfying
v(;) := 0. An element of N (notation: i 2 N) and a nonempty subset S of N (notation:
S  N or S 2 2N with S 6= ;) is called a player and coalition respectively, and the associated
real number v(S) is called the worth of coalition S. The size (cardinality) of coalition S is
denoted by jSj or, if no ambiguity is possible, by s. Particularly, n denotes the size of the
player set N . Given a (transferable utility) game hN; vi and a coalition S, we write hS; vi for
the subgame obtained by restricting v to subsets of S only (i.e., to 2S). Let G denote the set
of all cooperative games with an arbitrary player set, whereas GN denotes the (vector) space
of all games with reference to a player set N which is xed beforehand.
Concerning the solution theory for cooperative TU-games, the paper is devoted to single-
valued solution concepts. Formally, a solution  on G (or on a particular subclass of G)
associates a single payo vector  (N; v) = ( i(N; v))i2N 2 RN with every TU-game hN; vi.
The so-called value  i(N; v) of player i in the game hN; vi represents an assessment by i of
his gains from participating in the game. Until further notice, no constraints are imposed
upon a solution  on G. In the next denition we present two key notions (out of four).
Denition 2.1. (cf. [1], [2], [6], [9], [11]) Let  be a solution on G.
(i) We say the solution  admits a potential if there exists a function P : G ! R satisfying
P (N; v)− P (Nnfig; v) =  i(N; v) for all hN; vi 2 G and all i 2 N . (2.1)
(ii) The mapping F : G ! G associates with any game hN; vi its solution game hN;F v i;
the characteristic function of which is dened to be
F v (S) :=
X
i2S
 i(S; v) for all S  N , S 6= ;. (2.2)
In words, the potential function P represents a scalar evaluation for cooperative TU-games,
of which any player’s marginal contribution agrees with the player’s value according to the
relevant solution  (notation: 5P =  ). If the potential exists, it is uniquely determined up
to an additive constant by the recursive formula n P (N; v)−
P
i2N P (Nnfig; v) = F v (N).
Usually, it is tacitly assumed that the potential is zero-normalized (i.e., P (;; v) := 0). In
fact, it is well-known that the potential function P (if it exists) is given by
P (N; v) =
X
SN;
S 6=;
F v (S)
s  (ns for all hN; vi 2 G.
By (2.2), the worth F v (S) of coalition S in the solution game hN;F v i represents the overall
gains (according to the solution  ) to the members of S from participating in the induced
subgame hS; vi (on the understanding that players outside S are not supposed to cooperate).
Generally speaking, the solution game diers from the initial game. Notice that both games
are the same if and only if the solution  meets the eciency principle, i.e.,X
i2N
 i(N; v) = v(N) for all hN; vi 2 G.
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The core topic involves the so-called consistency treatment for solutions that admit a po-
tential. For that purpose, we need to recall one basic theorem from Calvo’s paper [1]; the
main result of which is referring to the well-known Shapley value. With the help of Sobolev’s
pioneer work [13] in the early seventies on the consistency property for the Shapley value,
we are able to prove, under certain circumstances, a similar consistency property for (not
necessarily ecient) solutions that admit a potential.
Theorem 2.2. Consider the setting of Denition 2.1.
(i) (cf. [1], Theorem, page 178) Let  be a solution on G. Then  admits a potential if
and only if  (N; v) = Sh(N;F v ) for all hN; vi 2 G. That is, any solution that admits a
potential equals the Shapley value of the associated solution game.
(ii) (cf. [6], Theorem A, page 591) The Shapley value is the unique solution  on G that
admits a potential and is ecient as well. Here the Shapley value Shi(N; v) of player
i 2 N in the n-person game hN; vi is dened as follows (cf. [12]):
Shi(N; v) =
X
SNnfig
1
n  (n−1s  

v(S [ fig) − v(S)

for all hN; vi 2 G, all i 2 N . (2.3)
Theorem 2.3. (cf. [13], [4])
With an n-person game hN; vi, a player i 2 N , and his payo xi 2 R (provided n  2), there
is associated the reduced game hNnfig; vxi
Nnfigi with player set Nnfig dened to be
vxiNnfig(S) :=
s
n− 1 

v(S [ fig) − xi

+
n− 1− s
n− 1  v(S) for all S  Nnfig. (2.4)
Then the Shapley value Sh on G is consistent with respect to this reduced game, i.e.,
Shj(Nnfig; vShi(N;v)Nnfig ) = Shj(N; v) for all hN; vi 2 G, all i 2 N , all j 2 Nnfig. (2.5)
That is, there is no inconsistency in what each of the players in the reduced game will get
according to the Shapley value, in either the reduced game or the initial game.
Now we are in a position to state and prove a similar consistency property for solutions
that admit a potential. Actually, for a given solution  , the appropriately chosen reduced
game resembles Sobolev’s reduced game (2.4), but they dier in that the initial game v is
replaced by the associated solution game F v . In summary, it turns out that the cornerstone
of the consistency approach to (not necessarily ecient) solutions is the solution game instead
of the game itself. Consequently, we have to dene the modied reduced game implicitly by
means of its associated solution game, on the understanding that a one-to-one correspondence
(bijection) between games and solution games is supposed to be available. 1
1In [2] (Denition 11, page 459), the solution game plays an identically prominent role in dening the
reduced game; the characteristic function of which is, however, from a dierent type since it deals with the
reduced game in the sense of Hart and Mas-Colell (cf. [6]). Our model deals with the reduced game in the
sense of Sobolev.
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Theorem 2.4. Let  be a solution on G that admits a potential. Suppose that the induced
mapping F : G ! G, as given by (2.2), is a bijection.
With an n-person game hN; vi, a player i 2 N , and his payo yi 2 R (provided n  2), there is
associated the modied reduced game hNnfig; ~vyiNnfigi with player set Nnfig which is dened
implicitly by its associated solution game hNnfig; F (~v
yi
Nnfig)
 i; the characteristic function of
which is dened to be
F
(~vyi
Nnfig)
 (S) :=
s
n− 1 

F v (S [ fig) − yi

+
n− 1− s
n− 1  F
v
 (S) for all S  Nnfig. (2.6)
Then the solution  on G is consistent with respect to this modied reduced game, i.e.,
 j(Nnfig; ~v i(N;v)Nnfig ) =  j(N; v) for all hN; vi 2 G, all i 2 N , all j 2 Nnfig. (2.7)
That is, there is no inconsistency in what each of the players in the reduced game will get
according to the solution  , in either the reduced game or the initial game.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.
Fix both the n-person game hN; vi and a player i 2 N (where n  2). Write w instead of F v .
Since  admits a potential, it holds, by Theorem 2.2(i),  (N; v) = Sh(N;F v ) = Sh(N;w).
The essential part of the proof concerns the claim that the solution game (2.6) technique
applied to the modied reduced game agrees with Sobolev’s reduced game (2.4) technique
applied to the initial solution game. Formally, we claim the following:
hNnfig; F (~v
 i (N;v)
Nnfig )
 i = hNnfig; wShi(N;w)Nnfig i (2.8)
Indeed, from both types of reduced games, we deduce that, for all S  Nnfig, it holds
F
(~v i(N;v)
Nnfig )
 (S)
(2:6)
=
s
n− 1 

F v (S [ fig) −  i(N; v)

+
n− 1− s
n− 1  F
v
 (S)
=
s
n− 1 

w(S [ fig) − Shi(N;w)

+
n− 1− s
n− 1  w(S)
(2:4)
= wShi(N;w)Nnfig (S)
This proves (2.8). From this we deduce that the following chain of four equalities holds:
 j(Nnfig; ~v i(N;v)Nnfig ) = Shj(Nnfig; F
(~v i (N;v)
Nnfig )
 )
(2:8)
= Shj(Nnfig; wShi(N;w)Nnfig )
(2:5)
= Shj(N;w)
=  j(N; v) for all j 2 Nnfig.
where the rst and last equality are due to Theorem 2.2(i) and the third equality is due to
Theorem 2.3 concerning the consistency property (2.5) for the Shapley value. This completes
the full proof of the consistency property for the solution  . 2
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Denition 2.5. Let  and  be two solutions on G. We say the solution  is F {standard
for two-person games if, for every two-person game hfi; jg; vi and every player k 2 fi; jg, it
holds that
k(fi; jg; v) = F v (fkg) + 12 

F v (fi; jg) − F v (fig) − F v (fjg)

Clearly, by (2.1){(2.2), a solution  that admits a (zero-normalized) potential, veries the F {
standardness for two-person games. We conclude this section with the next axiomatization.
Theorem 2.6. Let  be a solution on G that admits a potential. Suppose that the induced
mapping F : G ! G, as given by (2.2), is a bijection. Then  is the unique solution  on G
that veries the following two properties:
(i) Consistency with respect to the modied reduced game implicitly dened through its
associated solution game (2.6) (with reference to the given solution  ).
(ii) F {standardness for two-person games.
Proof of the uniqueness part of Theorem 2.6.
Besides the given solution  , suppose that a solution  on G veries the consistency property
and the F {standardness for two-person games. We prove by induction on the size n of the
player set N that (N; v) =  (N; v) for every game hN; vi. The case n = 2 holds trivially
because of the F {standardness for two-person games applied to both solutions. From now
on x an n-person game hN; vi with n  3. Due to the induction hypothesis, it holds that
(M;u) =  (M;u) for every game hM;ui with 2  jM j  n− 1. Note that, for all i 2 N , all
xi 2 R, yi 2 R, it follows immediately from (2.6) that
F
(~vyi
Nnfig)
 (S) = F
(~vxi
Nnfig)
 (S) + s 
xi − yi
n− 1 for all S  Nnfig.
In other words, the two solution games hNnfig; F (~v
yi
Nnfig)
 i and hNnfig; F
(~vxi
Nnfig)
 i are strate-
gically equivalent (with reference to the translation vector xi−yin−1  (1; 1; : : : ; 1) 2 RNnfig) and
thus, the covariance property for the Shapley value Sh applies in the sense that it holds
Shj(Nnfig; F
(~vyi
Nnfig)
 ) = Shj(Nnfig; F
(~vxi
Nnfig)
 ) +
xi − yi
n− 1 for all j 2 Nnfig. (2.9)
For all i 2 N and all j 2 Nnfig, we obtain the following chain of equalities:
j(N; v) = j(Nnfig; ~vi(N;v)Nnfig ) by consistency for 
=  j(Nnfig; ~vi(N;v)Nnfig ) by induction hypothesis
= Shj(Nnfig; F
(~vi (N;v)
Nnfig )
 ) by Theorem 2.2(i)
(2:9)
= Shj(Nnfig; F
(~v i (N;v)
Nnfig )
 ) +
 i(N; v)− i(N; v)
n− 1 by covariance for Sh
=  j(Nnfig; ~v i(N;v)Nnfig ) +
 i(N; v)− i(N; v)
n− 1 by Theorem 2.2(i)
=  j(N; v) +
 i(N; v)− i(N; v)
n− 1 by consistency for  
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We conclude that
j(N; v) −  j(N; v) =  i(N; v)− i(N; v)
n− 1 for all i 2 N and all j 2 Nnfig.
By interchanging the roles of players i and j, the latter result yields
i(N; v) −  i(N; v) = i(N; v) −  i(N; v)(n− 1)2 for all i 2 N .
Since n  3, we arrive at the conclusion that i(N; v) −  i(N; v) = 0 for all i 2 N . Thus,
(N; v) =  (N; v) for every game hN; vi as was to be shown. 2
3 Consistency property for pseudovalues: a detailed exposi-
tion
In this section we aim to clarify that, if we deal with a particular type of solutions called
pseudovalues, then various elegant interpretations arise in the study of the modied reduced
game as given by (2.6). Besides the various appealing interpretations in some kind of termi-
nology, we claim that the implicit denition of the modied reduced game can be transformed
into an explicit one, although the resulting explicit description becomes rather laborious.
In [5] a semivalue on GN is dened to be a function  : GN ! RN which veries the
linearity, symmetry, monotonicity, and projection axioms. It was shown in [5] (Theorem
1, page 123) that every semivalue is of the following form, the formula of which will be
used as our starting point (but we omit certain non-negativity constraints). Throughout
this section, lower-case letters s, t, n, and so on, are supposed to be non-negative integers
because they are meant to refer to sizes of coalitions. For notation’ sake, let P = fpns g
represent an arbitrary collection of real numbers called weights and meant to be read as
P := fpns 2 R j n 2 f1; 2; : : :g; s 2 f0; 1; : : : ; n− 1gg.
Denition 3.1. We say a solution  on G is a pseudovalue on G if there exists a collection
of weights P = fpns g such that the following two conditions hold:
(i)  i(N; v) =
X
SNnfig
pns 

v(S [ fig) − v(S)

for all hN; vi 2 G, all i 2 N ; (3.1)
(ii) the collection of weights P = fpns g possesses the upwards triangle property, i.e.,
pn+1s + p
n+1
s+1 = p
n
s for all n  1 and all 0  s  n− 1. (3.2)
In words, in the setting of populations with a variable size, the \weight" of the formation
of a coalition of size s in an n-person population equals the sum of the \weights" of the
two events which may arise by enlarging the population with one person (namely, two
coalitions of consecutive sizes s and s+ 1 respectively in an (n+ 1)-person population).
For reasons that will be explained later on, no further constraints are imposed upon the
weights (e.g., they are not necessarily non-negative). A pseudovalue with reference to non-
negative weights is known as a semivalue (cf. [5]). It is straightforward to check that any
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pseudovalue  admits a potential (due to the upwards triangle property for P = fpns g), where
the potential function P : G ! R is given by
P (N; v) =
X
SN;
S 6=;
pns−1  v(S) for all hN; vi 2 G.
To start with, we determine an explicit formula for the associated solution game. As an
adjunct, we become engaged with induced collections of weights verifying the upwards triangle
property.
Proposition 3.2. Let  be a pseudovalue on G of the form (3.1) associated with the collection
of weights P = fpns g. Let F : G ! G be the induced mapping as given by (2.2). Then the
following holds:
(i) F v (T ) =
X
ST

s  pts−1 − (t− s)  pts

 v(S) for all hN; vi 2 G, all T  N . (3.3)
(ii) If the collection P = fpns g possesses the upwards triangle property, so does the induced
collection ~P = f~pns g dened by
~pns := (s+ 1)  pns − (n− 1− s)  pns+1 for all n  1 and all 0  s  n− 1. (3.4)
(iii) For every n  1, given that ~pns = (s + 1)  pns − (n− 1 − s)  pns+1 for all 0  s  n− 1,
then the weights pns can be re-discovered as follows:
pns =
1
n  (n−1s  
n−1X
t=s
(
n
t+1
  ~pnt for all 0  s  n− 1. (3.5)
(iv) Suppose (3.5) holds for all n  1. If the collection ~P = f~pns g possesses the upwards
triangle property, so does the induced collection P = fpns g.
(v) The special case pns =
1
n
(n−1
s
 yields ~pnn−1 = 1 and ~pns = 0 for all n  1, all 0  s  n−2.
For expositional convenience, the computational, but straightforward proof of Proposition
3.2 is postponed till the appendix. By (3.4){(3.5), there exists a natural one-to-one corre-
spondence between collections of weights that satisfy the upwards triangle property. Par-
ticularly, any pseudovalue  induces another pseudovalue ~ , the weights of which are given
by (3.4) (and vice versa, by (3.5)). For instance, by part (v), the Shapley value induces
the pseudovalue ~ that agrees with the marginal contribution principle in the sense that
~ i(N; v) = v(N) − v(Nnfig) for every game hN; vi and all i 2 N . Another well-known
pseudovalue, called Banzhaf value, corresponds to the uniform weights pns =
1
2n−1 for all
0  s  n − 1, while the induced pseudovalue is associated with the weights ~pns = 2s+2−n2n−1
for all 0  s  n − 1, the smallest weights of which are negative. Because of this observa-
tion, we do not want to exclude pseudovalues associated with not necessarily non-negative
weights. Throughout the remainder of this section, the induced pseudovalue turns out to be
of particular interest in order to provide an appealing explicit and implicit interpretation of
the modied reduced game.
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In the second stage we claim two preliminary results each of which is of interest on its own.
Firstly, by (3.6), we state that the mapping F induced by an initial pseudovalue  may
be interpreted as the potential function of the induced pseudovalue ~ (in the sense that
P ~ (N; v) := F
v
 (N) for every game hN; vi). Secondly, by (3.7), in comparing the two solution
games associated with the modied reduced game and the initial game respectively, the
increase (decrease) to the worth of any coalition turns out to be coalitionally-size-proportional
to the increase (decrease) to the payo of the removed player, taking into account his initial
payo and his payo according to the induced pseudovalue ~ (with respect to the subgame
the player set of which consists of the partnership between the coalition involved and the
removed player).
In the third and nal stage we claim, by (3.10), that a specically chosen weighted sum of
the latter increases (decreases) to the payo of the removed player represents the increase
(decrease) to the worth of any coalition, in comparing the modied reduced game and the
initial game respectively. The recursively computable coecients used in the relevant weighted
sum are identical to those which appear in the explicit determination of the inverse of the
bijective mapping F associated with the pseudovalue  . This mapping turns out to be
bijective under very mild conditions imposed upon the underlying collection of weights P
that prescribe the pseudovalue  .
Theorem 3.3. Let  be a pseudovalue on G of the form (3.1) associated with the collection
of weights P = fpns g. Let F : G ! G be the induced mapping as given by (2.2). Further, let
~ be the induced pseudovalue on G associated with the induced collection of weights ~P = f~pns g
as given by (3.4). Then the following holds:
(i) F v (T )− F v (Tnfig) = ~ i(T; v) for all hN; vi 2 G, all T  N , all i 2 T . (3.6)
(ii) F
(~vyi
Nnfig)
 (S)− F v (S) =
s
n− 1 

~ i(S [ fig; v) − yi

(3.7)
for all hN; vi 2 G, all i 2 N , all S  Nnfig, and all yi 2 R (provided n  2).
Proof of Theorem 3.3.
(i) Let hN; vi 2 G, T  N and i 2 T . By (3.3), player i’s incremental return with respect to
the coalition T in the associated solution game hN;F v i is determined as follows:
F v (T )− F v (Tnfig)
(3:3)
=
X
ST
~pts−1  v(S)−
X
STnfig
~pt−1s−1  v(S)
=
X
ST;
S3i
~pts−1  v(S) +
X
STnfig

~pts−1 − ~pt−1s−1

 v(S)
=
X
STnfig
~pts  v(S [ fig) −
X
STnfig
~pts  v(S)
=
X
STnfig
~pts 

v(S [ fig) − v(S)

(3:1)
= ~ i(T; v)
where the third equality is due to the upwards triangle property for ~P (see Proposition 3.2(ii)).
(ii) Let hN; vi 2 G, i 2 N , and yi 2 R (provided n  2). >From the implicit denition of the
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modied reduced game as given by (2.6), and (3.6) applied to T = S [ fig respectively, we
derive the following:
F
(~vyi
Nnfig)
 (S)− F v (S)
(2:6)
=
s
n− 1 

F v (S [ fig) − F v (S)− yi

(3:6)
=
s
n− 1 

~ i(S [ fig; v) − yi

for all S  Nnfig.
2
Theorem 3.4. Let  be a pseudovalue on G of the form (3.1) associated with the collection
of weights P = fpns g satisfying pnn−1 > 0 for all n  1. Let F : G ! G be the induced
mapping as given by (2.2). Further, let ~P = f~pns g be the induced collection of weights as
given by (3.4). For every t  1, let the induced collection of constants fqtk(s) 2 R j k 2
f1; 2; : : : ; tg; s 2 f1; 2; : : : ; t+ 1− kgg be dened recursively by
qt1(s) := ~p
t
s−1 for all 1  s  t and
qtk+1(s) :=
(
t−s
k
  ~pt−ks−1
~pt−kt−1−k
 qtk(t− k)− qtk(s) for all 1  k  t− 1, all 1  s  t− k. (3.8)
Then the following holds:
(i) Given that F v (T ) =
P
ST
~pts−1  v(S) for every game hN; vi and all T  N (see (3.3)),
the data v(T ), T  N , of any game hN; vi can be re-discovered as follows:
~ptt−1  v(T ) =
X
ST;
S 6=;
(−1)t−s  q
t
t−s(s)
~pss−1
 F v (S) for all T  N , where qt0(t) := ~ptt−1 (3.9)
(ii) Let ~ be the induced pseudovalue on G associated with ~P = f~pns g. Then it holds
~ptt−1 

~vyiNnfig(T )− v(T )

=
X
ST;
S 6=;
(−1)t−s  q
t
t−s(s)
~pss−1
 s
n− 1 

~ i(S [ fig; v) − yi

(3.10)
for all hN; vi 2 G, all i 2 N , all T  Nnfig, T 6= ;, and all yi 2 R (provided n  2).
(iii) For the special case pns =
1
n
(
n−1
s
 , then (3.10) reduces to Sobolev’s reduced game (2.4).
The rather technical proof of Theorem 3.4 will be postponed till the appendix.
Remark 3.5. To conclude with, we specify the explicit determination for the worth of one-
and two-person coalitions in the (n− 1)-person modied reduced game (2.6), without regard
to the number n of players in the initial game.
Let  be a pseudovalue on G of the form (3.1) associated with the collection of weights
P = fpns g satisfying pnn−1 > 0 for all n  1. Let ~ be the induced pseudovalue on G associated
with the induced collection of weights ~P = f~pns g as given by (3.4).
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Consider an arbitrary n-person game hN; vi and let i 2 N , yi 2 R. By applying (3.10) to one-
and two-person coalitions T = fjg and T = fj; kg respectively, and (3.1) to the pseudovalue
~ , we obtain that the worth of one- and two-person coalitions in the (n− 1)-person modied
reduced game hNnfig; ~vyiNnfigi of the form (2.6) is determined as follows (recall that, by (3.8),
q21(1) = ~p
2
0):
~vyiNnfig(fjg) = v(fjg) +
1
(n− 1)  ~p10


~p21  [v(fi; jg) − v(fjg)] + ~p20  v(fig) − yi

;
~vyiNnfig(fj; kg) = v(fj; kg) +
2  ~p32
(n− 1)  ~p21


v(fi; j; kg) − v(fj; kg)

+

2  ~p31  ~p10 − ~p21  ~p20

(n− 1)  ~p21  ~p10


v(fi; jg) − v(fjg) + v(fi; kg) − v(fkg)

+
2  ~p30  ~p10 − ~p20  ~p20
(n− 1)  ~p21  ~p10
 v(fig) + 2 

~p20 − ~p10

(n− 1)  ~p21  ~p10
 yi
In the framework of three-person games, we obtained a complete description of the two-person
modied reduced game and by tedious, but straightforward calculations, one may verify that
the consistency property  j(Nnfig; ~v i(N;v)Nnfig ) =  j(N; v) holds true for the pseudovalue  with
respect to three-person games. One useful tool concerns the upwards triangle property for ~P.
Remark 3.6. The relationship (3.6) is also useful to provide, in the framework of pseudoval-
ues, an alternative proof of the fundamental equivalence theorem between any pseudovalue
 and the Shapley value, that is  (N; v) = Sh(N;F v ) for every game hN; vi. Let us outline
this alternative proof that diers from Calvo’s proof (cf. [1]) and Sanchez’ proof (cf. [11]) of
the equivalence theorem applied to solutions that admit a potential.
Let hN; vi 2 G. Recall that, by straightforward combinatorial computations, the solution
game hN;F v i is determined by (3.3) and in turn, the incremental returns of any player in the
solution game are determined by (3.6), i.e.,
F v (T [ fig) − F v (T )
(3:6)
= ~ i(T [ fig; v) (3:1)=
X
RT
~pt+1r 

v(R [ fig)− v(R)

for all i 2 N and all T  Nnfig. From this and some additional combinatorial computations,
we deduce that, for all i 2 N , the following chain of equalities holds:
Shi(N;F v )
(2:3)
=
X
TNnfig
1
n  (n−1t  

F v (T [ fig) − F v (T )

=
X
TNnfig
1
n  (n−1t  
X
RT
~pt+1r 

v(R [ fig) − v(R)

=
X
SNnfig
 n−1X
t=s
(n−1−s
t−s
  1
n  (n−1t   ~pt+1s



v(S [ fig) − v(S)

=
X
SNnfig
pns 

v(S [ fig)− v(S)

(3:1)
=  i(N; v)
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For the sake of the last equality but one, we need to establish the following claim:
n−1X
t=s
(n−1−s
t−s
  ~pt+1s
n  (n−1t  = pns or equivalently,
n−1X
t=s
(t
s
  ~pt+1s = (n− s)  (ns  pns (3.11)
for all 0  s  n − 1. The proof of the claim (3.11) proceeds by induction on the size n,
n  s+ 1, where s  0 is xed. Recall (3.4) and the upwards triangle property of P = fpns g.
The inductive proof of (3.11) is left to the reader.
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4 APPENDIX: Two technical proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.2.
(i) Let hN; vi 2 G and T  N , T 6= ;. By assumption of a pseudovalue  of the form (3.1)
applied to the subgame hT; vi, and by some straightforward combinatorial computations, we
obtain
F v (T )
(2:2)
=
X
i2T
 i(T; v)
(3:1)
=
X
i2T
X
STnfig
pts 

v(S [ fig) − v(S)

=
X
ST

s  pts−1 − (t− s)  pts

 v(S)
(ii) Let n  1. By (3.4) and the upwards triangle property (3.2) for P = fpns g, it holds
~pn+1s + ~p
n+1
s+1
(3:4)
=

(s+ 1)  pn+1s − (n− s)  pn+1s+1

+

(s + 2)  pn+1s+1 − (n− 1− s)  pn+1s+2

= (s+ 1) 

pn+1s + p
n+1
s+1

− (n− 1− s) 

pn+1s+1 + p
n+1
s+2

(3:2)
= (s+ 1)  pns − (n− 1− s)  pns+1
(3:4)
= ~pns for all 0  s  n− 1.
(iii) Fix n  1. The proof of (3.5) proceeds by backwards induction on the size s, 0  s  n−1.
For s = n − 1, (3.5) holds because of ~pnn−1 = n  pnn−1. For 1  s  n − 1, we deduce from
(3.4) and the induction hypothesis applied to s that it holds
pns−1
(3:4)
=
~pns−1
s
+
n− s
s
 pns
=
~pns−1
s
+
n− s
s
 1
n  (n−1s  
n−1X
t=s
( n
t+1
  ~pnt
=
1
n  (n−1s−1 
n−1X
t=s−1
(
n
t+1
  ~pnt
(iv) For every n  1 and 0  s  n− 1, write ns := 1
n
(n−1
s
 . Let n  1 and 0  s  n− 1.
On the one hand, we deduce from the assumption (3.5) that it holds
pn+1s + p
n+1
s+1
(3:5)
= n+1s 
nX
t=s
(n+1
t+1
  ~pn+1t + n+1s+1  nX
t=s+1
(n+1
t+1
  ~pn+1t
= n+1s 
(n+1
s+1
  ~pn+1s + n+1s + n+1s+1   nX
t=s+1
(n+1
t+1
  ~pn+1t
=
~pn+1s
s+ 1
+ ns 
nX
t=s+1
(n+1
t+1
  ~pn+1t
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On the other hand, we deduce from the upwards triangle property for ~P = f~pns g that it holds
pns
(3:5)
= ns 
n−1X
t=s
(
n
t+1
  ~pnt
= ns 
n−1X
t=s
( n
t+1
  ~pn+1t + ~pn+1t+1 
= ns 
( n
s+1
  ~pn+1s + ns  n−1X
t=s+1
( n
t+1

+
(n
t
  ~pn+1t + ns  ~pn+1n
=
~pn+1s
s+ 1
+ ns 
nX
t=s+1
(
n+1
t+1
  ~pn+1t
Since both computational methods yield the very same outcome, we conclude that pn+1s +
pn+1s+1 = p
n
s . Finally, the statement in part (v) is a direct consequence of (3.4). 2
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Let hN; vi 2 G.
(i) For every T  N , T 6= ;, it suces to prove the next equality:X
S$T;
S 6=;
~pts−1  v(S) =
X
S$T;
S 6=;
(−1)t+1−s  q
t
t−s(s)
~pss−1
 F v (S) (4.1)
Fix T  N and S $ T , S 6= ;, as well. We aim to determine the coecient of the term v(S)
in the sum given by the right hand of (4.1). The term v(S) occurs in any expression F v (R)
as long as S  R, provided that R $ T . Thus, we need only to consider those coalitions R
satisfying S  R $ T and each such coalition R, say of size r, s  r  t− 1, induces the term
(−1)t+1−r  q
t
t−r(r)
~prr−1
 ~prs−1  v(S)
Notice that, for any size r, s  r  t − 1, there exists (t−st−r coalitions R of size r satisfying
S  R $ T . Hence, for every xed S $ T , S 6= ;, the coecient of the term v(S) in the sum
given by the right hand of (4.1) is determined by the next sum:
t−1X
r=s
(t−s
t−r
  (−1)t+1−r  qtt−r(r)  ~prs−1~prr−1
By construction based on (3.8), for all 1  s  t− 1, it holds
t−1X
r=s
(
t−s
t−r
  (−1)t+1−r  qtt−r(r)  ~prs−1~prr−1 =
t−sX
k=1
(
t−s
k
  (−1)k+1  qtk(t− k)  ~pt−ks−1~pt−kt−1−k
(3:8)
=
t−sX
k=1
(−1)k+1 

qtk+1(s) + q
t
k(s)

= qt1(s) + (−1)t+1−s  qtt+1−s(s)
(3:8)
= ~pts−1 + 0 = ~p
t
s−1 This proves (4.1).
14
(ii) (3.10) is a direct consequence of both (3.7) and (3.9) applied to the initial game and the
reduced game as well.
(iii) By (3.4), pns =
1
n
(n−1
s
 implies ~pnn−1 = 1 and ~pns = 0 for all n  1, all 0  s  n − 2.
By (3.8), qt1(s) = 0 whenever 1  s  t− 1 and thus, qtk(s) = 0 whenever k  2. Therefore,
(3.10) reduces to the next equality:
~vyiNnfig(T )− v(T )
(3:10)
=
t
n− 1 

~ i(T [ fig; v) − yi

(3:1)
=
t
n− 1 

v(T [ fig) − v(T )− yi

Obviously, the relevant equality agrees with Sobolev’s reduced game (2.4). 2
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